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THE SHREVEPORT CASE.
In March, 1911, the Railroad Commission of Louisiana initiated
proceedings with the Interstate Commerce Commission to prevent
the Texas and Pacific Ry. Co., The Houston, East and West Ry.
Co., and the Houston and Shreveport Ry. Co. from maixtaining
discriminatory rates against the town of Shreveport, Louisiana and
in favor of Dallas, Texas.1 The Louisiana Commission, for instance,
set forth that the Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. was charging a rate
on farm wagons from Shreveport, Louisiana, to Marshall, Texas,
a distance of 42 miles, of 56 cents per 100 pounds, while charging
from Dallas to Marshall, both in Texas, a distance of 147 miles, a
rate of only 36.8 per 100 pounds.
It was conceded by the railroads that the situation constituted
undue prejudice to Shreveport and undue preference to Dallas
within the meaning of the third section of the Interstate Com-
merce Act,' provided that section be applicable. But they contended
that the section was not applicable, because the intrastate rate from
Dallas to Marshall was not voluntarily established but was forced
upon the railroads by the authority of the State of Texas, and in
order to come within the meaning of the third section the acts
complained of must have been voluntary.
On this point Commissioner Lane, speaking for the majority
of the Commissioners said: "An interstate carrier must respect
the federal law, and if it is also subject to state law it must respect
that in so far as it can without doing violence to its obligations under
the federal authority. Before us are carriers, which undeniably
discriminate directly against interstate traffic. To this charge
they plead that all they have done was to obey the orders of a state
commission, as against which they were helpless. They appealed
to no court for relief nor to this Commission. When the state of
Louisiana after years of endurance makes complaint to this body,
these carriers make no showing of the reasonableness of their rates
other than that heretofore dealt with-a traffic adjustment equalizing
gateways-and even in this defense all the carriers do not join.
* * * While the Texas Commission has evidenced a policy of
'Meridith vs. St. Louis & Southwestern Ry. Co., 23 1. C. C. Repts. 31.
2Act of Feb. 4, 1887, C. 104, 24 Stat. 380.
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home protection for its own state cities, there is every evidence that
the carriers moving into and within Texas accepted this policy as
their own, claiming that not to have adopted it would have led
to reprisal on the part of state authorities. Such conditions may
not continue under this act. The interstate carrier which adopts
a policy, even under state direction, that makes against the inter-
state movement of commerce must do so with its eyes open and
fully conscious of the responsibilities of the federal law, which
guards commerce among the several states against, discrimination."
The railroads petitioned the Commerce Court to' set aside the
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.3 The Court, how-
ever, accepted the ruling of the Commission and adopted the lan-
guage of Commissioner Lane. Judge Mack concurred because he
said that his Brethren had found some evidence, though slight,
that the railroads had solicited and voluntarily adopted the Texas
rates. But he said, "In the absence of judicial decree, temporarily
or permanently suspending the force and effect of the Texas rates,
the railroads would be compelled to obey them, just as the railroads
and the public are required to observe interstate rates duly made
and published by the railroads, even though they be such as would
be set aside for unreasonableness, unjust discrimination, or undue
prejudice, on direct attack before-the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission."
The decision lacks force on the argument that the railroad
voluntarily adopted the rates of the Texas Commission. The only
evidence adduced to support this fact was that the railroads had
not brought suit to set aside the Texas rate. The railroads did
enter formal protest, but took no further action. They would
certainly be bound by the order of the state of Texas until relieved
of it by a federal order. To hold the railroads to the necessity
of attacking the ruling of the commission of Texas seems to place
an unwarranted burden on the railroads. There was some doubt
whether the commission had authority to supervise a rate of this
character, and it would hardly seem that it was the duty of the
railroads to test- this authority. The entering of formal protest
was sufficient to absolve them from the position of being a party
to the rate.
Why did not the Railroad CommisSion of Louisiana appeal to
the Interstate Commerce Commission to set aside the rates es-
sTexas & Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Com., 205 Fed. 380.
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tablished by the Texas Commission? By ordering the railroads to
change their rates so as not to discriminate against Shreveport,
it left no option with the railroads, but to reduce their interstate
rates (which had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission) to the same basis as the Texas rate, for the Texas rate re-
mained in force with which the railroads were bound to comply.
The railroads together with several intervening parties took
the case to the Supreme Court.4 After disposing of the other points
of the case the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hughes, dis-
missed our present discussion thus: "The further objection is
made that the prohibition of section three is directed against un-
just discrimination or undue preference only when it arises from
the voluntary act of the carrier and does not relate to acts which
are the result of conditions beyond its control. East Tennessee &c.
Rwy. Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 18.
The reference is not to any inherent lack of control arising out of
traffice conditions, but to the requirements of local authorities which
are assumed to be binding upon the carriers. The contention is
thus merely a repetition in another form of the argument that the
Commission exceeded its power; for it would not be contended that
local rules could nullify the lawful exercise of Federal authority.
In the view that the Commission was entitled to make the order,
there is no longer compulsion upon the carriers by virtue of any
inconsistent local requirement."
In the East Tennessee case, supra, the city. of Chattanooga
complained of the fact that through rates from the Atlantic seaboard
to Nashville were less than to Chattanooga, a shorter distance.
The railroads explained that they were compelled to charge a lower
rate to Nashville in order to compete with railroads running direct
from Chattanooga to New York and other eastern points. Be-
sides, the railroads said, it would in no way aid Chattanooga to
compel them to reduce their rates, for the other railroads would
simply carry all of the freight. The court held that it was neces-
sary for the railroads to charge the lower rates in order to com-
pete for the business; and that it being a necessity, the railroads
had not discriminated against Chattanooga within the meaning
of the 3rd section of the Commerce Act. The same point was
decided in Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. vs. Belmer, 175 U. S. 648.
'Houston & Texas Ry. Co. vs. U. S., 234 U. S. 343.
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But the Supreme Court in the Shreveport case distinguishes
between a necessity arising out of traffic conditions and a necessity
arising from state law. They say in the former case that the rail-
roads are compelled to reduce their rates, while in the latter case
they may disregard the state law with impunity. It is true that
there are two different forms of necessity involved, but why a dis-
tinction between the two should be made is not clear. If the rail-
roads ceased their discrimination forced upon them by inherent
traffic conditions, they would lose freight, while, if they ceased
didcrimination forced upon them by the state law, they would be
liable to state punishment. It seems that the state law inflicted
even a greater necessity on the railroads than the traffic conditions.
To say that the railroads were not bound by the local rate as
established by the Texas Commission, upon the issuing of the order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission is manifestly absurd.
With both orders standing, the state order calling for a low rate and
the federal order to prevent discrimination, the railroads were com-
pelled to take a course which would satisfy both of these orders
if possible; in other words to reduce the interstate rate to the level
of the intrastate rate.
It was very doubtful until the Shreveport decision whether or
not the Interstate Commerce Commission had power to govern
rates of the character of those established by the Texas Commis-
sion, and, if the railroads had, upon the order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to cease discrimination against Shreveport,
raised their local rate, it would have caused reprisal by the state of
Texas.
The purpose of the order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was not to compel the railroads to reduce their interstate
rate, but to allow them to raise their intrastate rate, which was un-
reasonably low. The method pursued was indirect and unjust
to the railroads. The complaint against the railroads should have
been dismissed, or the state of Texas should have been made a party
and proper proceedings taken against that state to prevent it from
maintaining its existing intrastate rate as interfering with inter-
state commerce, and in this way protect the railroads from any
loss or injury caused by complying with the order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
The state of Texas has since voluntarily withdrawn its local
rate, which has made it possible for the railroads to establish uni-
form rates on the basis of the approved interstate rate. Never-
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theless, it leaves the question of Federal supremacy undecided
and Texas or any other state may with impunity establish and
force the railroads to accept intrastate rates even though they
interfere with interstate commerce rates.
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